The Art of Communicating Engineering Judgement

Tim Procter shares his experience as a graduate engineer developing engineering judgement and his approach to communicating this knowledge to various stakeholders. This article was originally published at Engineering Education Australia.

As a graduate engineer (some years ago) moving from university to the workplace I was surprised to discover just how vast and varied engineering knowledge actually is. After completing an intensive degree and gaining what felt like a good understanding of engineering fundamentals, it came as something of a surprise to realise that becoming expert in just one engineering sub-sub-discipline could truly take a lifetime.

Science fiction legend, Arthur C. Clarke noted that any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. To the qualified but inexperienced engineer that I was, a senior engineer discussing advanced engineering knowledge appeared quite the same; the outputs were comprehensible, but not their derivation. Such knowledge was generally referred to as demonstrating ‘engineering judgement’.

Engineering judgement is used when making a decision. It involves an engineer weighing up, in their own mind, the pros and cons of the potential courses of action being considered. This process may be formal, intuitive or deliberate or, in most cases, an intricate combination of the three.

As a graduate I regarded this engineering judgement with a sense of awe, as I considered the years of experience my seniors wielded when pronouncing how the engineered world should be. Surely, I thought, one day in the (distant) future my engineering judgement will arrive. And then I too will have the knowledge!

Oddly enough, I found personal development tends not to work this way. My engineering judgement gradually developed with my experience as I dealt with problems of greater complexity. I discovered that I understood the decision required, the options available, and the best course of action, but the act of explaining the decision was often more difficult than simply knowing the answer.

This knowing/telling paradox gives a clue as to the source of my graduate self’s confusion and awe of my senior colleagues’ wisdom. While the best solution may have been found, a problem persists; sometimes this judgement must be explained to a non-technical layperson, including graduate engineers.

Explaining engineering judgement to non-technical persons happens in a range of contexts – financial, managerial, corporate, governmental, legal, and the wider community. It is especially important for these stakeholders to understand the decision-making processes when dealing with safety, the environment, project management, operations and a whole host of other engineering considerations. This means that engineering jargon and equations will often work against the goal of communication.

The most effective approach I have found to communicate engineering judgement is to explain the options considered, their gradual exclusion, and the specific reasons each excluded option was considered unsuitable. It requires a clear explanation of critical success factors and how each option supports or hinders each of these goals. This best reflects the engineering process, where much of the time the ‘best’ option is actually the ‘least worst’ option, given the constraints it must meet and the corresponding trade-offs in time, cost, quality, and efficiency.

I find this process is generally understood by non-technical persons and helps prompt structured and useful questions from listeners: Why was this option not appropriate? How were the specific benefits of this option considered? This provides a good enquiry framework for engineering graduates and others to both understand and develop their own engineering judgement.

It is critical for graduates to develop their engineering judgement and the ability to communicate it. It brings confidence to both the engineer and their stakeholders, as each better understands the others’ needs and decisions. It is, in many ways, the single most important skill I have developed in my career, and something that each day I practise, in both senses of the word.

My advice for graduates is to take any opportunity to do the same. Make your best decisions for the problems you face, and then discuss your judgements with your managers, mentors and teammates. And when more complex engineering problems arise you’ll be able to not only solve them but also explain them. And that’s something that every engineer should be able to do.

Also published at:

https://eea.org.au/insights-articles/art-communicating-engineering-judgement

https://frontier.engineersaustralia.org.au/news/the-art-of-communicating-engineering-judgement/

Update on Victoria’s Energy Safety Framework Review

On 19 January 2017, the Minister for Energy, Environment and Climate Change announced an independent review of Victoria’s Electricity Network Safety Framework, to be chaired by Dr Paul Grimes. On 5 May 2017, the Minister announced an expansion to the Review's Terms of Reference to include Victoria’s gas network safety framework.The interim report was released in October and can be viewed at: https://engage.vic.gov.au/application/files/6915/0942/0613/Interim_Report_-_Review_of_Victorias_Electricity_and_Gas_Network_Safety_Framework.pdfR2A provided submissions for both gas and electrical safety which have previously been blogged at:

• Gas Supplementary Issues Paper - Review of Victoria's Electricity and Gas Network Safety Framework
• Review of Victoria's Electricity and Gas Network Safety Framework

From R2A’s reading of the interim report, the primary recommendation is that there should be a single piece of energy safety legislation that covers electricity, gas and pipelines, all to be administered by a single agency, Energy Safe Victoria.Pleasingly, from R2A’s perspective, the decision making criteria for safety should be consistent with that of the 2004 OHS act, that is, a precautionary approach that uses the SFAIRP principle rather than an ALARP principle using target levels of risk.In coming to this view Dr Grimes comments favourably on the R2A understanding of issues involved. He notes that R2A in its submission to the Review expressed a view that there needs to be clarity and consistency around the question of what constitutes “ reasonably practicable ” and, in addition, the language that is adopted to express the objective of the safety framework.

Nevertheless, the methodological distinction between the target risk and a precaution based approaches, and the other important practical implications identified by R2A, are highly relevant to the Review’s consideration and have helped inform its assessment of leading practice. (footnote on page 72)

Dr Grimes concludes that:

The Review is persuaded by the arguments that a pure target risk approach, while having some theoretical elegance, is less robust in practice than a precaution - based approach…(page 73) … the Review is proposing a draft recommendation that this definition be formally adopted for electricity and gas network safety.

The R2A Board considers the adoption of the precaution based approach to be an outstanding outcome and congratulates Dr Grimes on his acuity.The cutoff date for comment on the interim report of the Review of Victoria’s Electricity and Gas Network Safety Framework is the 27^th November.

Witness Box Whiteboards?

Engineers tend to think problems through as visual concepts, particularly as a concept sketch or design. This is reflected by a lawyer trained CEO of a water authority:

Now that you mention it, I have noticed that if I get between the whiteboard and my engineers they do tend to go mute.

That is, for an engineer a picture really is worth a 1,000 words. Well, at least a picture with some numbers on it.The courts, on the other hand, use words exclusively. It can be something of an art form to read a judgment to establish the key decision point. And when an engineer is in a witness box trying to explain to two barristers and a judge (who have not done a science based subject for many years) a complex technological matter, it is small wonder that uncertainty arises in the collective mind of the court.It would be most desirable to ensure the efficiency of the rule of law to include a whiteboard in the witness box when an engineer is on the stand.

Engineering’s Golden Rule

The Golden Rule, or the rule of reciprocity, states that one should treat others as one would wish to be treated. It is an astonishingly widespread maxim, appearing in some form in virtually every major religion and belief system.As a result, the Golden Rule permeates Australian society, in our courts and parliaments, and our laws and judgments. It is an integral and inalienable part of our social infrastructure.Cambridge professor David Howarth’s recent book, Law as Engineering: Thinking About What Lawyers Do, considers some of the implications of this. Howarth’s thesis is that most UK lawyers do not argue in court. Rather, on behalf of their clients, they design and implement, through contracts, laws, deeds, wills, treaties and so forth, small changes to the prevailing social infrastructure.Australian law practice seems to follow a similar pattern, and this is a good and useful thing; without these ongoing small changes to social infrastructure there would be large scale confusion, massive imposition on the court system, and general, often escalating, grumpiness.Engineering serves a similar function. Engineers, on behalf of their clients, design structures and systems that change the material infrastructure of society.This is also a good and useful thing. And, with the history of and potential for significant safety impacts resulting from these physical changes, engineers have over time developed formal design methods to ensure safe outcomes.These methods consider not only the design at hand, but also the wider physical context into which the design will fit. This includes multi-discipline design processes, integrating civil, electrical, mechanical, chemical (and so on) engineering. It also includes consideration of what already exists, and the interfaces that will arise. Road developments will consider their impact on the wider network, as well as nearby rail lines, bike paths, amenities, businesses, residences, utilities, the environment, and so on.Howarth’s book considers this approach to design in the framework of changing social infrastructure. He argues that lawyers, in changing the social infrastructure, ought to consider how these changes may interact with the wider social context to avoid unintended consequences. As an example, he examines the 2009 global financial crisis in which, he argues, many small changes to the social infrastructure resulted in catastrophic negative global impacts.Following formal design processes could have, if not prevented this situation occurring, perhaps at least provided some insight into the potential for its development. But the question arises: how should negative impacts on social infrastructure be identified? In contrast to engineering changes to material infrastructure, social infrastructure changes tend not to have immediate or obvious environmental or health and safety impacts.One option that presents itself is also apparent in good engineering design. Engineers follow the Golden Rule. It is completely embedded in engineering practice, and is supported and reinforced by legislation and judgements. Engineers design to avoid damaging people in a physical sense. Subsequent considerations include environmental harm, economic harm, and so on.A key aspect of this is consideration of who may be affected by infrastructure changes. Proximity is critical here, as well as any voluntary assumption of risk. That is, potential impacts should be considered for all those who may be negatively affected, and who have not elected to put themselves in that position. This is particularly important when others (such as an engineer’s or lawyer’s client) prosper because of such developments.A recent example involving material infrastructure is the Lacrosse tower fire in Melbourne. In this case, a cigarette on a balcony ignited the building’s cladding, with the fire spreading to cladding on 11 floors in a matter of minutes. The cladding was subsequently found to not meet relevant standards, and to be cheaper than compliant cladding.In this case, it appears a design decision was made to use the substandard cladding, presumably with the lower cost as a factor. Although it is certain that the resulting fire scenario was not anticipated as part of this decision, the question remains as to how the use of substandard materials was justified, given the increased safety risk to residents. One wonders if the developers would have made the same choice if they were building accommodation for themselves.In a social infrastructure context, an analogy may be that of sub-prime mortgages being packaged and securitized in the United States, allowing lenders to process home loans without concern for their likelihood of repayment. In this scenario, more consideration perhaps ought to have been given by the lawyers (and their clients) drafting these contracts as to, firstly, how they would interact with the wider context, and, secondly, whether the financial risks presented to the wider community as a result were appropriate. In many respects the potential profits are irrelevant, as they are not shared by those bearing the majority of the risk.The complexities here are manifest. Commercial confidentiality will certainly play a role. No single rule could serve to guide choices when changing social or material infrastructure, and unforeseen, unintended consequences will always arise. But, when considering the ramifications of a decision, a good start might be: how would I feel if this happened to me?

This article first appeared on Sourceable.

Specialist, Manager or Innovator?

“The analogy with music is useful because nobody can dispute the fact that there are three types of musician: the composer, the performer and the conductor.  Nor can anybody disagree that there are world-famous musicians who are outstanding in one of these three professions without having outstanding talent for either of the other two.  If we agree on this, we can separate them and deal with them in their special fields.”  Desiderius Orban (1978) What is Art all About?Engineers may have more in common with artists than they realise.Young engineers are often stymied by the many career paths available to them.  One way to select the best path is to know your strengths. Engineers can excel as specialists (like the first violinist for the MSO), as managers (like the conductor of the MSO) or as a creator or innovator of new goods or services, like a composer. They can also be good at any two and sometimes all three, although this is actually comparatively rare.Orban points out that being good at all three is what is required to be an excellent artist, which is why very good artists are so few in number.  But it’s less of an issue for engineers as they usually work in well organised teams with multiple, often overlapping skill sets.Specialists are usually the easiest to identify.  Attend a conference or review of published technical papers will suggest who they might be.  Organisers show up as managers and consulting engineers, especially after the completion of an MBA. Creators (if they are organised) show up on the rich list. If disorganised, their ideas will be consumed by others and they are likely to be impoverished.All of us have elements of these skills to some extent.  The trick is determine your profile and then select a career accordingly.  Not only will the engineer do ‘right’ by themselves, they will also achieve the full potential on behalf of the organisations and society they serve.As an example, the diagram above describes a successful consulting practice with two directors with complementary skills profiles.

Timeline of Key Australian Risk Concepts and Events

R2A’s recent work on dam safety led us to develop a timeline of key risk and due diligence concepts and events as they have appeared and influenced Australia. This goes some way to explaining the current divergence between the AS/ISO 31000 hazard-based risk management approach, and the common law and WHS Act precaution-based due diligence approach.In essence, both approaches attempt to demonstrate risk equity, that is, that no one is unreasonably exposed to risk. The key difference between the approaches is that the due diligence approach focuses on ensuring a minimum acceptable level of protection is in place, in the form of precautions. This is an inherently objective test – either the precautions are in place or they are not.In contrast, the hazard-based approach aims to show that a maximum tolerable level of risk is not exceeded, an inherently subjective approach which requires (amongst other things) accurate predictions of the probability of complex potential future events.Both of these approaches have the primary aim: risk equity. However only the precaution-based due diligence approach was developed and has continued to be accepted by the courts and parliaments of Australia, as clearly shown in the timeline below.Blue relates to the precaution-based (SFAIRP) approach, red to the hazard-based (ALARP) approach.1932      Concept of ‘neighbours’ developed for negligence cases in the UK[1].1949      Disproportionality ‘unpacked’ in the Coal Boards case in the UK.[2].1974      ‘So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable’ (SFAIRP) concept introduced in UK safety legislation [3]. This incorporated a demonstration of risk equity in the form of minimum levels of precautions1980      Interpretation of ‘reasonableness’, the common law precautionary balance established by the High Court of Australia (HCA)[4].1982      Issues not ‘remote or fanciful’ must be considered (HCA)[5].1985      Victorian Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Act adopts ‘so far as practicable’[6]1986      Elimination of the remaining ties between the legislature and judiciary of Australia and the UK making the High Court of Australia judicially paramount in Australia[7].1987      UK public inquiry (the Layfield Sizewell B review) recommends the UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE) develop guidance as to the tolerability of safety risk from nuclear power plants.[8]1988      Concept of ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP) introduced by UK HSE in response to the Layfield review recommendation. This appears to be an attempt to make safety risk a ‘science’[9] by using target (acceptable or tolerable) levels of risk to demonstrate risk equity.1990      ‘Safety Case’ concept authoritatively articulated in the UK[10].1995      AS4360 risk management standard released, explicitly adopting the ALARP approach[11]. Revised in 1999, retains the ALARP approach[12].2001      That ALARP is equal to SFAIRP formally articulated in UK[13].2004      Maxwell QC reviews failures of acceptable or tolerable risk target approach to safety. Articulates SFAIRP[14]. Equates Victorian OHS Act ‘so far as practicable’ to SFAIRP.2004      AS4360:2004 released, maintaining the ALARP approach[15].2004      Victorian Parliament adopts SFAIRP in legislation[16].2009      AS31000:2009 released, incorporating the ALARP approach from AS4360[17]. This is subsequently referred to in other standards including AS55000:2014 (asset management)[18], and AS5050:2010 (business continuity)[19].2011      Model Work Health and Safety (WHS) legislation adopts SFAIRP approach following the Victorian OH&S Act and due diligence[20] case law.2011      Victorian Government accepts precautionary approach embodied in model WHS legislation by adopting all recommendations of the Powerline Bushfire Safety Taskforce[21].2014      Engineers Australia articulates the difference between SFAIRP and ALARP and issues guidance accordingly[22].Footnotes - [1] UK House of Lords. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 1932.[2] UK Court of Appeal CA. Edwards v. National Coal Board.[3] UK Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974.[4] High Court of Australia. Wyong Shire Council vs Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40.[5] High Court of Australia. Turner v. South Australia (1982) 42 ALR 669.[6] Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985.  Parliament of Victoria.[7] Australia Act 1986 (Cth), Australia Act 1986 (UK).[8] F. H. B. Layfield, Great Britain Department of Energy (1987). Sizewell B Public Inquiry Report.[9] The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations. UK Health and Safety Executive.[10] The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster.  W D Cullen (1990) London. HMSO.[11] AS4360:1995 – Risk management. SAI Global (1995).[12] AS4360:1999 – Risk management. SAI Global (1999).[13] Reducing Risks, Protecting People. UK Health and Safety Directorate (2001).[14] Occupational Health and Safety Act Review. C Maxwell (2004).[15] AS4360:2004 – Risk management. SAI Global (2004).[16] Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004. Act No. 107/2004[17] AS31000:2009 – Risk management – Principles and guidelines. SAI Global (1999).[18] AS55000:2014 – Asset management - Overview, principles and terminology. SAI Global (2014).[19] AS5050:2010 – Business continuity - Managing disruption-related risk. SAI Global (2010).[20] Model Work Health and Safety Bill. 23 June 2011. Safe Work Australia.[21] Victorian Government Response to The Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Recommendations 27 and 32. December 2011[22] Engineers Australia, Risk Engineering Society (2014). Safety Case Guideline. Third edition.

Are Australian Standards Becoming Irrelevant?

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a standard is “an authoritative or recognised exemplar of correctness, perfection, or some definite degree of any quality.”

Of course, this is but one of several definitions, and there seems to be at least five types of ‘standards.’

1. Standards as measures: These are wholly scientific standards. They directly describe standardised measures such as those described in the Système International d'Unités, SI. That is, metre, kilogram, second, ampere, kelvin, mole and candela.
2. Specification standards: These describe the physical attributes necessary for harmonised results. For example, bullet and barrel specifications must align to enable a rifle to operate. These use the first meaning extensively and was historically the source of engineering standards organisations.
3. Standards as rules: These describe particular technical requirements to achieve standardised performance outcomes, like the Wiring Rules (AS 3000). This can include elements of the first two.
4. Design standards: These can be a combination of measures, specifications and rules. It makes them eminently arguable.

For example, Paul Wentworth a partner Minter Ellison in 2011 when discussing AS/NZS 7000 (Overhead Line Design) and the legal status of standards and relevance to professional liability noted that “Engineers should remember that in the eyes of the court, in the absence of any legislative or contractual requirement, an Australian Standard amounts only to an expert opinion about usual or recommended practice. Also, that in the performance of any design, reliance on an Australian Standard does not relieve an engineer from a duty to exercise his or her skill and expertise.”

And in an article in Engineers Australia Magazine of March 2009, Leigh Duthie a partner at Baker & McKenzie noted that “Engineers cannot avoid liability in negligence or for TPA (Trade Practices Act) contravention by simply relying on a current or published standard or code.”

5. Technique or method standards: For example, various risk management standards like COSO or AS 31000. These can have elements of the first four ‘standards’ but can also include an aspect requiring the realisation of a particular organisational or community expectation.

The primary difficulty with these standards is that their meaning is in the method. Results are only consequences. That is, the meaning of ‘standard’ ranges from wholly scientific definitions that have no moral attributes to opinions that are promoted to achieve political alignment.

Standards organisations don’t seem to recognise this range of meanings even though it is very important. A technique ‘standard’ is often promoted as having the same reliability as a ‘measure’ standard even though such ‘technique’ standards should really be regarded as opinion pieces.

Diagram that demonstrates that Australian Standards are falling down the hierarchy of significance

However, these difficulties are being recognised by many. For example, it seems that Australian governments have determined via their legislative processes (especially the model Work Health and Safety Acts, Rail Safety National Law and the like) that Australian Standards will no longer be called up in legislation. Apparently, parliamentary counsel has indicated that it is inappropriate to derogate the power of parliament to unelected standards committees.

The intention is no WHS Act, Regulation or Code of Practice will refer to them. And a Code of Practice under WHS legislation (once approved) has the force of law in many jurisdictions. Established rules standards, like AS 3000 (the Wiring Rules) are applied by making such codes a condition of registration to be an electrician rather than being called up by an electrical safety act or regulation.

Other advice is that for expert witness matters, an engineering guideline developed by a professional body like Engineers Australia, acting within its members’ areas of competence, will always have higher standing to an industry based Australian standard in Australian courts. This means that the rise of Bodies of Knowledge (BoKs) is also becoming more prevalent as a legally superior alternative to standards in practice matters.

There is also an argument that many standards organisations do not comply with professional organisations’ Codes of Ethics with regard to giving credit where credit is due. For example, Australian Standards do not acknowledge the (volunteer) individuals on the relevant committee in a standard, unlike for example, the National Fire Protection Association of the USA. And the floating of the commercial arm of Standards Australia in 2003 (SAI Global Limited) effectively commercialised the volunteer effort and intellectual property contributions of the many contributing Engineers Australia members at least, without recognition.

One of the results of all this is that Australian Standards are falling down the hierarchy of significance as shown in the diagram, being displaced by both Codes of Practice and Expert Guidelines. This is certainly making many of them less relevant.

If this becomes an enduring trend, then this has potentially serious implications for commercial organisations like SAI Global which depend on the continuing success of such standards documents.

This article first appeared on Sourceable.

Swinburne 2016 Wrap-up

The post-graduate course R2A presents at Swinburne became a core unit in 2016. Over 80 students enrolled in first semester. The course is based around the 2016 edition of the R2A Text.

Presenters from R2A included Gaye Francis, Tim Procter, Richard Robinson and Adriaan den Dulk.

The enrolment numbers were a step up from previous semesters, and the topics students chose for their projects varied accordingly, including transport, construction, waste management, and one particularly memorable demonstration of an exploding mobile phone battery.

We enjoyed the increased diversity in contributions and viewpoints, and we look forward to engaging with more new students in our 2017 Engineering Due Diligence course.

When does SFAIRP = ALARP?

The primary reason for the judicial rejection of target levels of risk or safety appears to hinge around the notion of uncertainty. When a risk expert says something is safe because the likelihood of its occurrence is around 1 x10^-6 pa or 1 x 10^-7 pa, they are really speaking of an inspired guesstimate or characterisation of uncertainty. That level of unlikeliness when describing a real world occurrence is just unpredictable. That is why our courts and parliaments have opted for demonstrating that all reasonable precautions are in place (the SFAIRP approach) as an alternative to calculating a difficult-to-defend number (the ALARP approach), after an event.However, there is a caveat to this SFAIRP approach. Our courts require that, even if all reasonable practicable precautions are in place, that if something is prohibitively dangerous, it ought to be stopped altogether. What does this mean?Prohibitively dangerous in risk terms means that its very bad, like a fatality, and that relatively speaking, it happens a lot, like for example, the road toll. People die on our roads regularly. So despite all the ways such fatalities can occur, because it happens a lot, it is relatively predictable. The road fatality number is generally accepted as being 1 x 10^-4 pa. This is 100 to 1000 times more likely than 1 x10^-6 pa or 1 x 10^-7 pa. Does this mean that the road fatality death rate could be used as a benchmark for prohibitively dangerous?Very possibly, at least on a large scale, industry wide basis. The courts discomfort with the ALARP approach is due to the hindsight driven nature of the courts. A death implies that the risk expert’s estimation of the rarity of the event prior to the occurrence was flawed. But if the whole activity was stopped because it approached 1 x 10^-4 pa, then the courts would be silent on the matter. That is, the more scientific, ALARP would hold sway. It would certainly be more definite in the sense that the courts would have to accept that it has a greater predictability.This suggests that SFAIRP = ALARP and could be used as a test to demonstrate when an activity is prohibitively dangerous.